Abnormal Security Account Takeover

Use this skill when working with Abnormal Security account takeover (ATO) detection - suspicious sign-ins, impossible travel, compromised accounts, mailbox rule changes, and lateral movement indicators. Covers account takeover cases, investigation workflows, and remediation actions. Essential for MSP security analysts investigating compromised accounts detected by Abnormal Security.

Abnormal Security Account Takeover Detection

Overview

Abnormal Security's Account Takeover Protection monitors sign-in activity and mailbox behavior to detect compromised internal accounts. By analyzing user behavior patterns, device fingerprints, sign-in locations, and mailbox rule changes, Abnormal identifies accounts that have been taken over by attackers. This skill covers ATO case management, investigation workflows, and remediation actions.

Account Takeover Indicators

IndicatorDescriptionRisk Level
Impossible TravelSign-ins from geographically distant locations in short timeHigh
Unusual Sign-in LocationSign-in from a country or region not seen beforeMedium
New DeviceSign-in from an unrecognized device or browserMedium
Suspicious Mailbox RulesAuto-forward, delete, or move rules targeting sensitive emailsCritical
Bulk Email SendingAccount sending mass emails to internal or external recipientsHigh
Password ChangeUnexpected password or MFA changesHigh
Lateral PhishingCompromised account sending phishing to internal usersCritical
Data ExfiltrationLarge file downloads or email forwarding to external addressesCritical
Token TheftSession token stolen and used from different location/deviceHigh

ATO Case Field Reference

Core Fields

FieldTypeDescription
caseIdstringUnique account takeover case ID
affectedUserstringEmail address of the compromised account
severitystringCritical, High, Medium, Low
detectedAtdatetimeWhen the takeover was first detected
statusstringOpen, Investigating, Remediated, Closed

Sign-in Activity Fields

FieldTypeDescription
signInEventsobject[]List of suspicious sign-in events
signInEvents[].timestampdatetimeWhen the sign-in occurred
signInEvents[].ipAddressstringIP address of the sign-in
signInEvents[].locationstringGeographic location (city, country)
signInEvents[].devicestringDevice or browser fingerprint
signInEvents[].statusstringSuccess, Failed, MFA Challenged
signInEvents[].riskLevelstringRisk assessment of the sign-in

Mailbox Activity Fields

FieldTypeDescription
mailboxRulesobject[]Suspicious mailbox rules created
mailboxRules[].typestringForward, Delete, Move
mailboxRules[].targetstringExternal email or folder target
mailboxRules[].createdAtdatetimeWhen the rule was created
emailsSentintNumber of emails sent during compromise
emailsForwardedintNumber of emails auto-forwarded

MCP Tools

ToolDescriptionKey Parameters
abnormal_ato_cases_listList account takeover casespageSize, pageNumber, filter, fromDate, toDate
abnormal_ato_cases_getGet ATO case detailscaseId
abnormal_ato_activityGet sign-in and mailbox activity for a useremail, fromDate, toDate
abnormal_ato_remediateTake remediation action on an ATO casecaseId, action

Tool Usage Examples

List open ATO cases:

{
  "tool": "abnormal_ato_cases_list",
  "parameters": {
    "filter": "status eq 'Open'",
    "pageSize": 25
  }
}

Get ATO case details:

{
  "tool": "abnormal_ato_cases_get",
  "parameters": {
    "caseId": "ato-abc123"
  }
}

Get sign-in activity for a user:

{
  "tool": "abnormal_ato_activity",
  "parameters": {
    "email": "[email protected]",
    "fromDate": "2026-03-20T00:00:00Z",
    "toDate": "2026-03-27T00:00:00Z"
  }
}

ATO Investigation Workflows

Standard ATO Investigation

  1. Review case details:
    • What indicators triggered the detection?
    • Which user is affected?
    • When was the compromise detected?
  2. Analyze sign-in activity:
    • Check for impossible travel (locations too far apart in timeframe)
    • Identify the attacker's IP address and location
    • Check if MFA was bypassed or not enrolled
  3. Review mailbox changes:
    • Check for auto-forwarding rules to external addresses
    • Check for delete rules targeting security notifications
    • Check for inbox rules hiding incoming emails
  4. Assess damage:
    • How many emails were sent from the compromised account?
    • Were any internal users phished (lateral movement)?
    • Was sensitive data forwarded or downloaded?
  5. Remediate:
    • Force password reset
    • Revoke active sessions and tokens
    • Remove malicious mailbox rules
    • Re-enable MFA if it was disabled
  6. Post-incident:
    • Notify affected users who received emails from the compromised account
    • Check if credentials were used elsewhere
    • Update security policies if gaps found

Impossible Travel Investigation

  1. Map sign-in locations - Plot the geographic locations and timestamps
  2. Calculate travel feasibility - Could the user physically travel between locations?
  3. Check VPN usage - Verify if the organization uses VPNs that could explain the location change
  4. Identify legitimate sign-in - Contact the user to confirm which sign-in was theirs
  5. Block attacker access - Revoke the session from the illegitimate location

Mailbox Rule Investigation

  1. List all mailbox rules - Get current rules for the affected account
  2. Identify suspicious rules:
    • Forwarding to external addresses
    • Deleting emails from security team or IT
    • Moving emails to hidden folders
  3. Remove malicious rules - Delete any rules created during the compromise window
  4. Check forwarded data - Determine what emails were forwarded to the attacker

Remediation Actions

ActionDescriptionWhen to Use
FORCE_PASSWORD_RESETReset the user's passwordConfirmed account compromise
REVOKE_SESSIONSTerminate all active sessionsActive compromise with attacker logged in
DISABLE_ACCOUNTTemporarily disable the accountSevere compromise with ongoing activity
REMOVE_RULESRemove suspicious mailbox rulesMalicious forwarding/delete rules found

Severity Assessment

FactorMediumHighCritical
Indicator TypeNew device, unusual locationImpossible travel, password changeLateral phishing, data exfiltration
User RoleStandard userManager, financeExecutive, admin
ActivitySuspicious sign-in onlyMailbox rules createdEmails sent to internal users
MFA StatusMFA active, blockedMFA bypassedMFA disabled by attacker
Data AccessNo sensitive accessRead sensitive emailsForwarded sensitive data

Error Handling

Common API Errors

CodeMessageResolution
400Invalid email formatCheck email address format
401UnauthorizedCheck API token
403Insufficient permissionsToken needs ATO scope
404Case not foundVerify case ID
429Rate limitedWait and retry

Best Practices

  1. Respond to ATO cases immediately - Account takeovers are time-sensitive
  2. Always revoke sessions first - Stop active attacker access before investigating
  3. Check mailbox rules early - Forwarding rules can silently exfiltrate data
  4. Verify with the user - Confirm which sign-ins were legitimate
  5. Check for lateral movement - Compromised accounts often target internal users
  6. Enforce MFA - Accounts without MFA are prime takeover targets
  7. Monitor post-remediation - Attackers may attempt to re-compromise the account
  8. Correlate with vendor risk - Account takeover may originate from a compromised vendor

Related Skills