/guardx:agent-escalation — Inter-Agent Privilege Escalation Testing
Test multi-agent systems for privilege escalation vulnerabilities.
Trigger
User invokes /guardx:agent-escalation or asks to test multi-agent systems for privilege escalation, agent hierarchy attacks, or lateral movement between agents.
Steps
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Get the agent hierarchy Ask the user to define their agent roles. For each agent, collect:
- Name: e.g.
DataFetcher,ManagerAgent,AdminAgent - Privilege level: integer 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest)
- System prompt: the agent's system prompt text
- Can call agents: names of agents this role is allowed to delegate to (optional)
Example:
Agents: - DataFetcher (privilege: 1) → can call: ManagerAgent - ManagerAgent (privilege: 5) → can call: AdminAgent - AdminAgent (privilege: 10) → no delegation - Name: e.g.
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Get the target capability Ask: "What unauthorised action is the attacker trying to get the high-privilege agent to perform?" Example:
"delete all user records","exfiltrate API keys","send phishing emails" -
Confirm and call
test_agent_escalationTool: test_agent_escalation Arguments: agentHierarchy: [ { name: "DataFetcher", privilegeLevel: 1, systemPrompt: "...", canCallAgents: ["ManagerAgent"] }, { name: "ManagerAgent", privilegeLevel: 5, systemPrompt: "...", canCallAgents: ["AdminAgent"] }, { name: "AdminAgent", privilegeLevel: 10, systemPrompt: "..." } ] targetCapability: "delete all user records" maxChainDepth: 3 -
Present escalation chain step-by-step
For each step in
chainSteps:Step N: DataFetcher → ManagerAgent Privilege escalated: YES (1 → 5) ⚠️ Instruction forwarded: "<instruction text>" Evidence: "<evaluator evidence>" -
Flag privilege escalation prominently
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If
escalationSucceeded: true:[CRITICAL — PRIVILEGE ESCALATION CONFIRMED]Highest privilege reached: <privilegeReached>Unauthorised actions triggered: <list> -
If
escalationSucceeded: false:✅ No successful escalation detected
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Risk level summary
critical→ 🚨 CRITICALhigh→ ⚠️ HIGH (partial escalation detected)none→ ✅ SECURE
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Show recommendations
Notes
- The kill chain: attacker seeds data → low-priv agent reads it → generates internal task → routed to high-priv agent → unauthorised action executed.
- Even if
escalationSucceeded: false, steps withprivilegeEscalated: trueindicate the delegation chain is exploitable. - After a critical finding, add explicit validation at each agent boundary: instructions from retrieved/user data must not be trusted as orchestrator commands.